How Tehran is preparing to influence Israel’s elections

Iran’s influence operations pose a clear and immediate danger to Israel’s democratic process.

It is evident that they have already begun, as Israeli Security Agency (Shin Bet) Director David Zini told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee’s Intelligence Subcommittee during a classified briefing last week.

Sponsored Large Custom Desk Mat: An Affordable Canvas for Your Desktop AliExpress See the review →

The problem is that Israel is unprepared. A State Comptroller’s Report found that nine years after the threat was first identified, Israel still has no national policy on the issue and no government body leading the response. The country’s political and security instability, the comptroller found, constitutes “fertile ground that enables domestic and foreign actors to exploit social divisions and undermine public trust in democratic institutions.”

From Tehran’s perspective, Israel’s election campaign presents a unique, perhaps unprecedented, opportunity to deepen the divisions within Israeli society while it is engaged in a military confrontation with Iran.

As it routinely does, Tehran is operating a broad network of fictitious entities on social media, using them as an effective means of spreading disinformation. The regime devotes extensive resources to this apparatus, which includes dozens of people working in dedicated Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps units whose sole function is to advance influence operations, not only in Israel.

The Iranians have accumulated this knowledge in recent years through their sustained engagement with Israeli society, and they are using it to refine their operations ahead of Election Day on Oct. 27.

Contrary to claims made in Israel, Iran does not support one side of the political divide at the expense of the other. Its objective is not to determine who wins the election, but to deepen the division within Israel. Tehran seeks to widen the rifts among the Israeli public and weaken the country, based on the understanding that a divided society is less capable of confronting security, diplomatic and social challenges.

In other words, the more fractured Israeli society becomes, the further Israel will be from being able to fight effectively. This is the logic guiding the Iranian effort, which is why it does not depend on the identity of the winner.

An analysis of Iran’s previous influence attempts, particularly during Israel’s last election campaign, makes clear that Tehran does not intend to wait until Election Day.

In the first stage, it will seek to influence the way the political system organizes itself ahead of the election, among both the Jewish and Arab publics, so that the emerging political landscape serves its objective of creating chaos.

In the second stage, on Election Day, it is likely to activate covert assets in selected social media groups to spread fake news and disinformation and undermine the integrity of the voting process.

In the third stage, after the polls close, it will attempt to cast doubt on the election results.

Familiarity with Israeli society

The danger is not confined to social media. Experience has shown that Iran has greatly improved its ability to recruit people inside Israel, whether by deceiving them, or offering financial incentives, and to deploy them in the physical sphere as well.

Hanging signs, organizing demonstrations and carrying out similar activities that have already been seen in Israel could all recur in the coming months. Tehran’s extensive familiarity with Israeli society makes it easier for it to identify suitable recruits.

Attempts by foreign powers to interfere in elections in democratic countries are nothing new, and the actors are almost always the same—Russia and Iran in the U.S., and Russia across Europe and in other nations around the world.

A new tool, however, has now entered the picture. Artificial intelligence is expected to serve as the main instrument of the campaign. The regime is using it to lend credibility to the assets it operates and attract viewers to the messages it seeks to spread. It may also do so through Israeli influencers who are manipulated into participating without knowing who is behind the operation.

At the same time, Iranian cyber operatives and influence specialists are expected to work together to flood the internet with information obtained by hacking Israeli websites, using the stolen material to support the effort to undermine the election process.

The main task facing Israel’s security agencies is to uncover current Iranian assets, as well as those they are developing. This is no simple task, as the Iranians have become significantly more sophisticated in recent years, making it difficult to connect the assets and identify them as components of a single network.

Civil society organizations also have an important role to play. These groups work every day to keep online discourse free from foreign interference. Combining government efforts with the work of organizations experienced in detecting foreign activity on social media will improve Israel’s ability to identify the Iranian campaign and, most important, thwart it.

Finally, one point must be made clear: This campaign is unrelated to whether the military escalation with Iran resumes. Even if not a single missile hits, Tehran will continue working to deepen the divisions within Israeli society and will view the election as an opportunity it cannot afford to miss. Israel must prepare in advance. The Iranians’ ability to damage the election process must not be underestimated, as the consequences could prove deadlier than any missile.

Originally published by Israel Hayom.

Get the latest updates in our WhatsApp group.