Pilot zones in Southern Lebanon: A failure foretold

The pilot zones in Southern Lebanon were intended to serve as a practical test of the Lebanese state’s ability and willingness, through the Lebanese Armed Forces, to implement the understandings with Israel: to establish its presence on the ground, prevent Hezbollah’s return and thwart the rehabilitation of its infrastructure.

However, developments in Zoutar al-Gharbiyeh, the first pilot zone, already point to the opposite trend. Under the cover of the Lebanese Army’s presence, Hezbollah’s apparatuses are returning to the village and re-establishing a civilian foothold there, which could later serve as the foundation for renewed military entrenchment.

Sponsored ThirdReality Zigbee Smart Plug Review: Power Monitoring & Range Extending in 2026 See the review →

The first sign of this was the return, at the end of July, of Hezbollah’s Islamic Health Organization. In officially published documentation, Hezbollah operatives from the health group were seen operating in Zoutar al-Gharbiyeh, including recovering the bodies of dead Hezbollah members, while accompanied by the Lebanese Army.

This is not an independent medical organization, nor is it an entity belonging to the Lebanese state. The Islamic Health Organization is subordinate to Hezbollah’s Executive Council and forms part of the support network for its military activity. The organization’s medical personnel are full participants in Hezbollah’s military-terrorist activity on the ground. During the war, its ambulances were used to transport operatives and weapons, while its medical facilities were used for military-terrorist purposes, including as assembly points, command posts and similar functions.

Several days after the Islamic Health Organization returned to the pilot zone, it was joined by the “Help One Another” Association (“Wa Ta’awanu”), another civilian arm affiliated with Hezbollah.

According to publicly available materials, the association entered Zoutar al-Gharbiyeh as early as July 29 and established temporary facilities in the village for the local council and to “assist the return of residents.” It provides food and meals, maps the needs of the population, and participates in rehabilitation and cleanup activities in cooperation with the Lebanese Army and Civil Defense. It even organized a religious event in the village marking Arba’een (“40” in Arabic) after Ashura, the day when Imam Husayn ibn Ali (the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad) was killed in the year 680 C.E. at the Battle of Karbala.

At first glance, this activity may appear to constitute legitimate humanitarian assistance, but this is precisely the sphere in which Hezbollah has operated for years. Through health, welfare, education, construction and financial institutions, Hezbollah creates dependence among the population on the services it provides, deepens its influence and establishes a civilian support structure that also facilitates its military activity.

The activities of “Wa Ta’awanu” illustrate the problem well. The association also serves as a platform for fundraising, including through an account at Hezbollah’s Al-Qard Al-Hassan, and maintains financial ties with Iran. Since the November 2024 ceasefire, it has deployed dozens of mobile structures throughout Southern Lebanon, ostensibly as temporary housing solutions. However, some of these structures have in practice been used for Hezbollah military activity and intelligence gathering, replacing infrastructure previously operated by the “Green Without Borders” association that was damaged during the war. Some of the structures deployed by “Wa Ta’awanu” were struck by the Israel Defense Forces during 2025.

This highlights the central problem with the pilot-zone model: Dismantling weapons and military infrastructure is not sufficient if, at the same time, Hezbollah’s civilian apparatuses are allowed to return to the area. These mechanisms are not marginal to the organization’s activities; they constitute the social, economic and logistical infrastructure upon which Hezbollah is able to rebuild itself.

Zoutar al-Gharbiyeh was supposed to demonstrate that the Lebanese Army was capable of replacing Hezbollah as both the sovereign authority and the provider of services on the ground. Yet the emerging picture is the opposite: The Lebanese Army is present, but Hezbollah’s apparatuses are operating alongside it and under its protection. If the state’s medical, welfare and reconstruction bodies do not fill the vacuum, Hezbollah will do so in their place.

In this sense, the failure of the pilot zones does not begin on the day armed Hezbollah operatives return to the villages. It begins much earlier—on the day Hezbollah’s civilian apparatuses return, restore their hold over the population and prepare the ground for the return of its military infrastructure.

In Lebanon, the formula is simple: Where there are Shi’ites, there is Hezbollah.

Get the latest updates in our WhatsApp group.